Introduction
One of the tenets of the market efficiency hypothesis is that financial asset prices are affected by the release of new information only. An important issue then becomes how to characterize the information set in relation to which the market is said to be efficient. Typically, empirical investigations that use high frequency data examine how "news" events influence financial markets. Often, though not always, the focus has been on explanations of daily or higher frequency movements in key financial asset prices, such as stock prices, exchange rates and interest rates. There has been relatively little attention, however, given to how news is defined. As we argue below, news comes from a variety of sources and its arrival takes place in a disaggregated form.
The interaction between interest rate and exchange rate levels has long been of interest to economists. This is evident, for example, from the publicity given in some countries to the socalled monetary conditions index which relies on a weighted average of the same two variables to provide a signal about the current stance of monetary policy (e.g., see Freedman 1995 , Ericsson et al. 1998 , Siklos 2000 . In addition, the literature has also been interested in the role played by interest rate and exchange rate volatility and, in particular, on market reactions to the release of a variety of "news" events.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the relationship between interest rate and exchange rate levels and volatility in a model where "news" events can influence both. News is disaggregated according to its type and source. For example, some news events can be quantified, as when news of a revision in a previously published forecast is announced. News can also be disaggregated according to whether the event in question is domestic versus international in nature.
Finally, other news events emanate for institutional reasons, as in, for example, events arising from central bank meetings. Moreover, we also propose the possibility that a form of selectivity bias exists in variables which are typically used to depict "news" events. The notion is simply that the econometrician cannot observe all the information that markets digest on a daily basis. In other words, news may have a bigger impact on interest rate or exchange rate behavior than previously thought because we observe movements in the variables of interest conditional on news events taking place. Also of interest is how news events, expectations, and agents reactions to them are transmitted across markets. The literature dealing with very high frequency data (i.e., at the intradaily frequency) terms these effects "meteor showers" effects, as distinct from "heat waves". The latter capture the impact of domestic news events on domestic financial asset prices.
In common with many related studies, we focus on daily data. The state of our knowledge about the interaction between news events and financial asset prices partly justifies reliance on relatively coarse data. Other arguments are also marshaled later in defense of the use of daily data for the purposes of our study.
Using the uncovered interest rate parity relation as the starting point, we examine the role and impact of news on the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates for Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy for the period covering January 1991-November 1997.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief and selective review of the literature linking news and volatility in interest rates and exchange rates.
Section 3 outlines the model to be estimated. Section 4 describes the data while the empirical evidence is presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with section 6.
Macroeconomic News and Financial Asset Prices
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The significance of news events on the volatility of interest rates and exchange rates has been widely discussed (Goodhart and O'Hara 1997 is a fairly recent survey). Some events occur with considerable regularity and may or may not be newsworthy (e.g., FOMC meetings, Bundesbank Council Meetings while others are irregularly spaced and may, therefore, be interpreted as "surprises" by financial markets. 2 News events also come in different forms such as when forecasters release their latest forecasts or the size of their forecast errors become known, or an unexpected change in interest rates is announced. Alternatively, news events can be political in nature, in which case the direction and size of the effect on asset prices is not clear. News effects need not, however, be restricted to the levels of financial asset prices. Central banks, for example, have become keenly aware that their actions, or inactions, can have important repercussions on the volatility of asset prices (e.g., see Siklos 1999 , and references therein). Volatility is often modeled in the context of one of the many variety of conditional variance models and the present paper also follows that approach (Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner 1992 is a well-known survey of the literature).
3 Asset price volatility also commonly exhibits clustering and asymmetry (e.g., see
Wong, Fauson, Barrett and McDonald (2001) , and den Haan and Spear (1998)).
News events are typically construed as representing an announcement of some kind which leads market participants to revise their expectations about the future course of financial asset price levels and their volatility. In large part this is due to the fact that relatively little is known about why volatility in financial asset prices is persistent nor has the precise connection between news events and that type of persistence been fully explained. If news events potentially have permanent consequences then the level of asset prices may be affected. However, to the extent that news events have only a transitory influence on asset prices, these may be expected to have a significant impact only on the volatility of financial time series. In econometric terms this can be likened to the difference between additive outlier and innovational outlier models. In the former, shocks have a permanent impact on the variables of interest and belong in models where the mean and/or variance changes suddenly; in the latter, the effect is gradual. The appropriateness of either of these models is, of course, dependent upon the properties of the series being investigated.
An additional question of interest is the time horizon over which market participants are expected to react. MacKinlay (1997) surveys event studies in economics and finance and finds that it is customary to define the event window to be longer than the announcement time, which permits examination of the duration over which the news events has an impact on the variable(s) of interest. He also finds that it is important to precisely date the timing of events (also see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997) . Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) use ultra high frequency data 4 to show that, while the impact of news events peak within minutes of an announcement, their impact on exchange rates (viz., DEM/USD) does persist for at least 16 hours. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the "longer term" responses are statistically significant at conventional significance levels. This is essentially a reaffirmation of the evidence of Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) , namely that macroeconomic announcements are quickly incorporated into financial asset prices. Indeed, it appears that the explanatory power of news events is rather small. One reason is that many studies deal with the relationship between stock markets and news where the theoretical impact of announcements or of other events is ambiguous. By contrast, studies of interest rate behavior reach strikingly different conclusions with the finding that bond prices move significantly in the wake of the arrival of public information. 5 Moreover, the sign of the relationship between the type of news event (e.g., an unexpected rise in economic growth) and bond prices is believed to be more unambiguous.
Goodhart, Hall, Henry and Pesaran (1993) report that the time series properties of the conditional volatilities of exchange rates is significantly influenced by the addition of news variables. 6 Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) consider intra-daily movements in the DM/USD exchange rate and whether the number of news items from Reuters has any statistically measurably impact. They find that macroeconomic news events affect relatively large changes in financial asset prices but are secondary in explaining exchange rate volatility. Indeed, at very high frequencies, they suggest that the trading process itself is an important factor. The reason is that trading volumes are an indicator of the diversity of opinions in financial markets and these can lead to large swings in volatility and, in particular, to volatility clustering. Kelly and Steigerwald (1999) formulate a model where entry and exit of informed traders can produce conditional heteroskedasticity in stock price changes so that the number of trades is possibly a poor proxy for volume.
Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) examine US Treasury bond prices to determine whether the persistence or autocorrelation in volatility can be explained by the release of macroeconomic news by the US government at regularly scheduled dates. The basic notion is that if such announcement shocks do not persist, financial asset prices quickly digest news and cannot therefore explain volatility persistence. The authors find that announcements cannot explain volatility persistence using daily returns for the period 1979-95.
Melvin and Peiers (1998) also consider the behavior of very high frequency data of the DEM/USD exchange rate in the December 1, 1993 to April 28, 1995 period. They are especially 6 McCurdy and Michaud's (1997) work suggests that one problem with attempts to fit GARCH-type models is that they spuriously indicate a unit root in the conditional volatilities (i.e., an IGARCH model) because the long memory component of financial asset returns are misspecified. They propose a model which combines a fractionally integrated GARCH (Baillie, Bollerslev and Mikkelsen 1996) with the asymmetrical power ARCH model of Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) in which the conditional variance is a linear function of lagged squared returns. We do not consider such models in the present study.
interested in the extent to which volatility effects spillover from a market in one location (e.g., Asia) to a market in another location (e.g., North America).
News events have often been used to interpret the behavior or reaction of the monetary authorities to market determined financial asset prices, in particular the exchange rate. For example, Dominquez and Frankel (1993) The foregoing brief and selective survey of the literature on the impact of news events on exchange rate or interest rate volatility suggests that the impact of "news" or announcement effects on financial asset prices and their volatility explain a small portion of the variance in asset prices. 10 Moreover, when such effects are detected, their size may at times not be economically significant.
Uncovered Interest Parity, News, and Selectivity Bias
Model Specification
We model the role of news on volatility in the context of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) model, unlike the usual approach of modelling the relevant financial asset prices separately.
While it is debatable whether UIP actually holds in practice the fact that theory implicitly recognizes the joint determination of exchange rates and interest rates is appealing under the circumstances since we believe it may be difficult to disentangle the news and volatility effects on interest rates from ones on the exchange rate and vice-versa. Our objective, however, is not to develop a complete empirical explanation for deviations from UIP. Instead, we are concerned with how the nature of the information set affects existing departures from some underlying equilibrium relationship and, more importantly, how different characterizations of the information set consisting of news events may or may not influence such disequilibria.
Let
S t = The spot price of one unit of the foreign currency; R t = The domestic nominal interest rate from t-1 to t;
The US nominal interest rate from t-1 to t.
UIP requires, once we add rational expectations, that
(1) McCurdy and Morgan (1991) show that the right-hand side of (1) is not, in fact, zero but is instead proportional to the conditional covariance of the spot price with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of domestic currency. In other words, there is a risk premium that needs to be incorporated in a testable version of (1). Moving (1+R t ) to the right-hand side of (1) and taking logs of both sides, we obtain
where log (1 + R t f ) and log (1 + R t ) are, respectively, approximated by R t f and R t and S t is log S t . Equation (2) is the more familiar looking expression for UIP.
We next consider various models of (2) expressed as deviations from UIP. First, consider the following widely used model of conditional volatility:
where ∆ represents deviations from UIP, namely ) (
,which is modeled as an MA (1) while the variance equation (4) is the usual GARCH(1,1) specification. The index i represents the individual countries in our sample. They are: Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The model is estimated separately for each country.
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Finally, we consider versions of (3)- (4) augmented with a vector of news variables. These are meant to capture varieties of news events. However, unlike other studies of this kind the vector of news variable is disaggregated according to the reporting agency, its geographical origins, as well as the type of news events (i.e., the release of a revised forecast versus some other type of announcement). In particular, we distinguish between domestic versus foreign sources of news events -(NEWS, NEWS*).
News generally consists of events that arise at unexpected, or irregular, intervals. This can come in several forms. For example, market participants may react to "shocks" to their expectations of macroeconomic conditions as proxied by the release of revisions to previously published forecasts. Hence, we consider the impact resulting not only from announcements of unexpected behavior (i.e., forecast errors) in key macroeconomic aggregates, but we make allowances for the fact that subsequent reactions in financial markets may be related to the size of forecast errors and their revisions over time. So far as we know these data have not been used in the present context. It is conceivable, therefore, that unexpectedly high or low forecast errors would have a separate impact on deviations from UIP.
Finally, we incorporate the influence of deterministic, or quasi-deterministic events such The foregoing variables, when included in the specifications considered so far, make up the equations to be estimated and reported below. News events and forecast errors are permitted to enter both the mean and conditional variance equations.
If, to conserve space, we denote the vector of news variables NEWS, regardless of type or source, then (3) and (4) become
Because of the well-known phenomenon of volatility clustering it is usually inappropriate to estimate GARCH (1,1) models with conditionally normal errors. Consequently, some prefer to assume a t-distribution (e.g., see Mills 1999, chapter 5; and Hamilton 1994, chapter 21) .
However, these views are based on the basic GARCH (1,1) model (3)-(4) and the assumption of conditionally normal errors is not as weak when the exogenous NEWS vector augments both the mean and variance equations, precisely because they attempt to capture the type of phenomena that produce fat tails in the first place.
Selectivity Bias in News Variables
As noted previously, an issue that has not received attention in the present context is the potential for selectivity bias in the construction of "news" events. This type of bias exists for a variety of reasons, as explained below. While it is difficult to specify the adjustment that is necessary to correct for this bias, we believe they influence previous findings concerning the impact of news on financial asset price movements. The bias may be viewed as a proxy for the portion of deviations from interest parity due to the existence of a risk premium which arises because of omitted or, in effect, censored information. For example, agencies that compile such information may be biased in favor of recording events originating in a particular country as opposed to events elsewhere. In addition, there may be some threshold below which an event will not be recorded and is therefore unobservable though, in principle, it may be "significant" enough to influence deviations from UIP. There could, in addition, be a bias toward foreign versus domestic events, or vice-versa. In addition, the reporting of news events could be biased by the existence of regular, quasi-deterministic events which are more likely to elicit news reporting. For example, regular FOMC and Buba meetings are more likely to elicit "news" than other types of meetings leading to a clustering of news events, a feature noted by Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998), and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) , among others. In general, of course, knowing what is "news" is difficult ex ante. One can well imagine that since regular central bank meetings are known to take place, it is possible that the meeting itself is not news. Indeed, our classification of news events considers whether the outcome of the meeting contains some unexpected information that is construed as "news" to financial markets.
Finally, as the markets for foreign exchange and bonds considered here are global, it is not immediately obvious which source of information is accessible when trading decisions are made.
say, Reuters, Bloomberg, Bridge, or other news retrieval services can also create difficulties.
There is the potential for a spurious clustering of news events making it difficult to extract the signal from the noise in the arrival of information since not all information is necessarily relevant to market participants. Perhaps more important, however, is the problem that not all forms of news are treated equally by market participants. Thus, announcements by central bankers might have relatively greater weight on interest rates and exchange rates than announcements from other sources. Similarly, some events may have permanent effects on expectations (e.g., a declaration of war) while others would be expected to have only a temporary influence (e.g., a revised forecast for some key macroeconomic indicators). In addition, news effects may be influenced by the geographical proximity of the source of the event. Hence, US based events may influence Canadian markets faster and to a greater extent than some European markets in part because the US is, by far, Canada's most important trading partner. Finally, market participants probably filter out certain pieces of information, either because they presume some types of information are irrelevant to their activities, or because information is obtained from selected sources only. This arises out of the phenomenon known as editing. Events are treated in isolation, rather than in the context of the broader interpretation.
13 A related literature suggests that an event must reach a certain threshold before it is even perceived. Hence, there are good reasons to disaggregate events by source or geographical location. An equally plausible source of selectivity bias arises because of the omission of trading activity or volume in most specifications of the type used here and in comparable studies. Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) , for example, forcefully argue that trading volume ought to be considered in a study of the impact of news on asset prices. To address the selectivity bias issue we adopt a fairly conventional approach. Regardless of the factors which infringe on the interpretation of news events we assume that there is a certain element of selectivity 13 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) , and references therein.
bias in the construction of such variables which has, to our knowledge, not been formally considered in the present context.
Put differently, the suggestion is that the econometrician observes only a subset of the information available to market participants. As a result, there is a bias which arises because the dating and interpretation of new information by the chosen source may be quite different from the market's point of view. As a result, the market may seem either to over or under-react when it may have reacted correctly in the first place. Even if announcements are collected or dated, without the benefit of hindsight, there remains a bias because we assume that markets will only react to announcements when, in fact, we cannot be sure that this is the only type of information markets will respond to. Alternatively, information is available or produced continuously, or, at the very least, need not be clustered only around announcement dates.
Suppose there is some latent "propensity", I*, to generate "news" such that
where γ is some "threshold" resulting in "news"; otherwise "news" is unobservable to the econometrician. In other words, we only observe news if it is reported at a particular moment of the choosing of the news organization, in a given location, and subject to the interpretation of the source as being meaningful enough to be reported. By contrast, traders and other market participants may have either a broader spectrum of information on which to draw upon and whose timing might differ from that of the news reporting organization. Hence, the typical news variables may only capture the salient events instead of the actual information set used by market participants. Hence, estimates of θ i , α i and β i in (5) and (6) will be biased without a correction for selectivity bias. is estimated and Heckman's lambda (i.e., λ, namely the inverse of Mill's ratio) is inserted into (5) and (6) -or the AR version of the same equations -resulting in
where the resulting coefficients become unbiased estimates in the presence of selectivity bias.
Equations (9) and (10) determines the likelihood of a news event being recorded. Hence, one can treat the selection bias problem as roughly equivalent to an omitted variable (λˆ) which, in the present context, is the inverse of Mill's ratio. Using NEWS it as the dependent variable, the "propensity" for news is assumed to be a function of deterministic and quasi-deterministic variables, namely holidays, weekend and meetings of the FOMC and the Buba Council. In addition, we postulate that "news"
is more likely to be reported the larger the change in the exchange rate or interest rate (in absolute value). 14 The notion is that large fluctuations in financial asset prices, in absolute value, are likely to lead not only to more "news" events but perhaps more persistent recording of such events.
Data
Exchange rates and interest rates from the following five countries were used: Canada (CAN), Germany (DM), France (FF), United Kingdom (UK£), and Italy (ITL). The DM, CDN and UK£ are defined in terms of US dollars (USD); the remaining two currencies are expressed in terms of the Deutschmark (DM). These five countries were chosen for several reasons. First, it is highly likely that news spreads across borders and will impact financial markets internationally. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to determine whether the same news event has the same impact across countries. The UK, Italy, Germany and France, countries that form the core of the European Union, are therefore natural candidates. Canada is also a natural candidate in view of its proximity to the US. Moreover, if disaggregation of news events is to be meaningful then this should also partly be reflected in cross-country differences. Finally, while the impact of the news event might vary across countries one would expect the sign of the effect, on certain variables, at least, to be the same. For example, if the Fed or the Bundesbank announce a "surprise" that is interpreted as an indication that interest rates will fall or rise then this event should affect interest rates and exchange rates in the same manner in all countries in the sample, at least at the daily frequency. The three month eurorate proxies short-term interest rates. The data are daily for the sample January 1, 1991 to November 14, 1997 totaling 1794 observations. 15 Although the data have been extended to 1999 we opted for a sample ending in 1997 for a couple of reasons. First, 1998 marks the year of the Asian crisis, as well as the lengthy discussion in Europe over the Stability pact and the setting of irrevocable exchange rates in anticipation of EMU. Both these events, one certainly unusual, dwarf news of all types from all sources. Second, 1999 marks the year that the European Central Bank began operations. As a result, the dependent variable no 14 Large absolute changes in exchange rates and interest rates were, not surprisingly, highly correlated with large changes in the volatility of these same variables. Hence, only the absolute value of changes were included. Granger and Ding (1995) also argue that the absolute value transformation is a proxy for measuring risk. 15 We are grateful to the Bank of Canada for providing the interest rate and exchange rate data.
longer is empirically meaningful for three of the countries in our sample. 16 Interest rates were converted to daily from annualized rates and scaled by 1000. The rate of change in the exchange rate is the first log difference in the spot rate and is similarly scaled. When data are unavailable, because of holidays, the previous day's value was used.
News variables were obtained from three sources: the New York Times (NYT), the London Financial Times (FT), and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Using the NYT, news series specific to a country (e.g., "Canada"), as well as under the headings "Banks and Banking", "Currency", "World Trade", "Finance", and specific to each country, were constructed. Since some events are conceivably international in scope, 17 a separate "World" news variable was also constructed as was a separate "US" news variable. The latter series consists of news events originating in the US under the same headings as listed above.
Following common practice (e.g., see MacKinlay 1997), the resulting event dummies are active the day the event is dated, as well as the days previous and following the event. 18 A variant on the basic dummy variable consists in permitting the effects of news events, both good and bad, to be reversed thus, in effect, imposing the restriction that news events have only a transitory influence on interest rates and exchange rates. Thus, for example, if an event takes place at time τ, the resulting dummy would be active at time τ-1, τ , τ+1 with a value of +1 and would take on a value of -1 on days τ+2, τ+3, τ+4 so that the sum of the values for the dummy for a particular event would be zero.
19 Table 1 forecast error can arise for at least two reasons: the release of some information which led to a revision of an earlier forecast, or a revision to actual values with the forecast held constant. We make no distinction between these two possibilities. Consequently, we treat this variables as "news" as opposed to a "pure" forecast error. This variable does have the advantage of permitting the impact on deviations from UIP to be a function of the size of the variable, and not just on the timing of the event. Forecast errors, where available, for the current account balance (CAFE), the Consumer Price Index (CPIFE), real Gross Domestic Product (GDPFE), industrial production (IPFE) and the unemployment rate (UNFE), were considered as potential influences on the shortterm interest rate and exchange rate. 22 As far as we are aware, these data first began to appear in the FT in November 1993 resulting in a sub-sample covering 1055 daily observations. In the empirical section we focus on this sample though results for the 1991-97 sample which excludes the FT data, and these turn out to be significant, are available from the first author upon request.
In part for this reason we constructed an alternative source and definition for the NEWS in the dummy active with a +1 if the news is US based, and +.5 if the news is from outside the US.
Otherwise the dummy is set to zero. Conclusions were unchanged when domestic and foreign news events were equally weighted. As pointed out earlier, however, it is unlikely that markets react identically to domestic versus foreign events.
The news variables from the WSJ was also catalogued into finer categories. They are:
Noise, Surprise_M and Surprise_CB. "Noise" refer to the news variables based on commentary by an official from the US Fed or from an official of another central bank. For example, on January 12, 1996, then Fed Vice-Chairman Alan Blinder expressed a belief that financial markets expected more than just a modest cut in the Fed funds rate in the future. This event is assigned as +1 because it is interpreted as positive news (both domestically and abroad) for financial markets.
The Surprise_M variable refers to surprise announcements that originate from financial markets. For example, on March 11, 1996 a report of surprisingly strong growth in jobs in the 22 For Canada and Italy the FT did not publish CAFE data, while for Italy no UNFE forecasts were published. Other idiosyncracies include: for Germany, UNFE is based on the number of unemployed in West Germany; all other German forecast errors are based on West Germany. After March 6, 1997 real GDP forecasts for Germany are for pan-Germany. For the UK, the retail price index is used instead of the CPI. Finally, in some instances, data were assumed to be released "during the week". In that case, the forecast error was dated on a Wednesday.
previous month suggested that financial markets did not expect the Fed to cut interest rates. This report was apparently unanticipated (according to the reporting of the event in the WSJ), and unfavourable, so is assigned a value of -1. The Surprise_CB variable refers to surprise announcements from a central bank (most often the Fed). For example, at a two-day meeting of the FOMC ending July 3, 1996, some officials expressed new concerns about higher future inflation, an unanticipated event, again according to the reporting of the news item in the WSJ. Consequently, this event is assigned a value of -1. The Surprise_CB variable is distinguished from "Noise" in that the former captures a specific (and unexpected) change in policy direction or economic outlook. By contrast, the latter event records a (surprise) opinion which may, or may not, have a bearing on the future course of interest rates or exchange rates. As before, international news events receive a weight of .5. With this approach we permit some latitude in the relative importance of news events. Table 2 summarizes the WSJ data. Fewer events in total are recorded than in the NYT source. Moreover, the first order autocorrelation is noticeably lower than for the NYT data.
Clearly, the construction of news variables is not immune to either the source or its definition.
Empirical Results
Table 3 presents what we call our baseline estimates, namely equations (5) There are several notable features in Table 3 . First, in common with other estimates based on daily data, there is considerable persistence in the variances (i.e., α+β). While we have accounted for a number of deterministic elements in the conditional variance we cannot be certain that all structural shifts were accounted for. As is well known (Lamoureux and Lastrapes 1990), persistence in the conditional variances may be sensitive to such misspecifications. Only in Germany's case can we formally rule out a unit root in the variance. 23 Note also that estimates of the MA parameters (θ) range from very small and statistically insignificant, at conventional levels of significance (e.g., Canada, France) to large and highly significant (Italy). Hence, deviations from UIP for Italy appear to react strongest to a lagged shock while such reactions are more muted in the other countries in our sample (e.g., Germany, UK). Versions of the same models with autoregressive parameters specified in the mean equation did not produce fundamentally different conclusions.
Turning to the impact of news events, domestic news events appear to have little statistically significant impact on mean deviations from UIP. The only exception is Canada while domestic news events in Germany and Italy influence the volatility of departures from UIP. The same is essentially true of US events. There is a little more evidence that "world" news events influence mean deviations from UIP, most notably for Germany, Italy and the UK, and the variance of the same series in the case of Canada. Changes in forecast errors represent a significant source in both the mean and conditional variance of deviations from UIP in all countries. Interestingly, however, while forecast revisions in the CPI are quantitatively important for Canada and Germany, unemployment forecasts are relatively more important for France. Current account forecast changes are also significant for the UK and Germany. Essentially, then, disaggregating certain news by type produces different results for different countries. Finally, FOMC meetings are found to have relatively greater impact on mean deviations in UIP, especially in Canada, France and the UK, than in the variance of ∆ t (except perhaps for Germany). Meetings of the Bundesbank Council (Buba) were not significant in any of the countries examined. Finally, the statistical significance of the news variables constructed from the WSJ across all countries, with the exception of Italy, suggests that the source, and possibly the timing, as well as the disaggregation of news variables, matters. It is difficult to tell from the estimates whether it is preferable to use the NYT versus the WSJ as sources of news. Some of the models that rely on the NYT source yield better estimates in terms of log likelihoods than others that rely on the WSJ data but there is no apparent pattern across countries.
24 Table 4 presents estimates of the selectivity bias corrected estimates based on estimates of λ (i.e., the inverse of Mill's ratio) derived from the probit (8). Detailed probit estimates are not shown but, based on McFadden's measure of R 2 for such regressions, these range from a low of .340 for Italy to a high of .391 for the UK. The results in Table 4 also incorporate "meteor shower" effects of volatility transmitted internationally. This is accomplished by adding the estimates of German conditional volatilities from Table 3 to the specifications for France, Italy and the UK. For Canada, we added estimates of the conditional volatilities from model (5)- (6) applied to changes in short-term US interest rates (results now shown). As before, maximum likelihood estimation was used to generate the results shown in Table 4 .The first column under each country's estimates are based on NYT and an aggregated version of WSJ news events while the second column shows the results from the NYT and where WSJ news events are disaggregated.
With few exceptions, a form of selection bias is present and significantly explains both the mean and variance equations, regardless of the length of the sample. Moreover, in every case, omission of the selectivity bias correction would have led to an underestimate of deviations from UIP in 24 It is tempting to include both sources of news in the same specification but there would doubtless be considerable double-counting of events.
both the mean and the conditional variances Moreover, as noted earlier, there are differences across countries with certain types of news more important in some countries than in others. These results are not affected by the selectivity bias correction factor nor from the attempt to capture "meteor shower" effects. Nevertheless, while the addition of these two factors improves model estimates, most notably for Germany, Italy and the UK, there is still a considerable difference in the explanatory power of the regressions across countries. Moreover, as clearly demonstrated for the UK and, as shown in Figure 1 , the selectivity bias corrected estimates display some success at eliminating volatility clustering. The improvement is more modest for other countries but these results do reveal that the bias correction is likely a statistically significant consideration in the modeling of the impact of news on financial asset prices. 
Conclusions
This paper has reconsidered the role of news on daily fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates. Using the uncovered interest parity (UIP) as the backdrop we argue that how one characterizes the information set of market participants can have a significant influence on deviations from UIP. The source, geographical significance and type of news event play a role in explaining the mean and volatility of daily data. Consequently, disaggregation of news events provides insights into how markets adjust their views about interest rates and exchange rates.
Nevertheless, it is equally important to consider that existing empirical estimates of news effects on asset prices omit information that financial markets use to assess the determinants of departures from uncovered interest parity. As a result, existing estimates of news effects on volatility suffer from a form of selectivity bias. Estimates of such bias are almost always a statistically significant influence on deviations from UIP in our sample of five countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK). Also, it would appear that an important component of volatility clustering stems from non-recurring events which occur relatively infrequently but give rise nevertheless to meteor shower effects. Notes: * means significant at the 1% level; + at the 5% level; and @ at the 10% level. Estimates are for model in equations (9) and (10). 
